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Pelias (2011) describes himself sitting at his desk trying to contemplate what 
qualitative work he wants to applaud and what efforts seem lacking. He’s curious as 
to why he is seduced by some work but not others, why the best work seems to 
engage and the weaker work seems to fall flat and leave him cold. Sitting there he is 
ready to consider other readings, but then he continues, putting an evaluative self 
forward that lists twelve contrasts between a flat piece and an engaging piece. One of 
these is as follows. 
The flat piece, a cold dinner, is forced down, taken in with little pleasure. It 
lacks the heat of the chef’s passions, the chef’s sensuous self who knows, 
without spice, all is bland. The engaging piece makes each mouthful worthy of 
comment, encourages lingering, savoring, remembering. In it’s presence, I 
want to invite my colleagues and students to enjoy its flavors. (Pelias, 2011, p. 
666) 
The list of contrasts provided by Pelias (2011) articulate the criteria he calls upon and 
the process he goes through when acting as an evaluative self. No doubt others, 
myself included, have gone though a similar process when faced with a journal paper 
to review, assess a student project, or respond in a class to the question: ‘But how do 
you know if a qualitative study is any good?’ Perhaps all this stimulated Tracey 
(2010, p. 840) to propose the following eight, universal, criteria for judging 
excellence in qualitative research.  
 Worthy topic 
 Rich rigor 
 Sincerity 
 Credibility 
 Resonance  
 Ethical  
 Meaningful coherence 
Likewise, in order to hold creative analytical practice ethnography to high and 
difficult standards, Richardson (2000, p. 254) outlines the following five criteria she 
uses when reviewing papers or monographs submitted for social scientific 
publication. 
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 Substantive contribution 
 Aesthetic merit 
 Reflexivity 
 Impact 
 Expression of a reality 
Reflecting on how arts-based research might be judged, Barone and Eisner (2012, pp. 
148-154) propose the following six criteria. 
  Incisiveness 
  Concision 
  Coherence 
  Generativity 
  Social significance 
  Evocation and illumination. 
More lists of criteria for judging various forms of qualitative research could be added. 
To deal with each in-depth would be, however, to labour the point made by Sparkes 
and Smith (2014) that when it comes to the criteria issue, scholars tend to create and 
use lists according to their specific needs and purposes. It is none the less so for the 
creative analytical practice of autoethnography.  
Lists of criteria for judging autoethnography 
Autoethnography is a blurred genre. This said, Holman Jones, Adams and Ellis (2013) 
propose a list of key characteristics that they believe bind autoethnographies together 
and differentiate them from other kinds of personal scholarship, such as, 
autobiography. These are purposefully commenting on/critiquing of culture practices; 
making contributions to existing research; embracing vulnerability with a purpose; 
and creating a reciprocal relationship with audiences in order to compel a response.  
Just how the characteristics outlined by Holman Jones et al. (2013) are played out in 
practice is, however, up for grabs. As Holman Jones (2005, p. 765) states following 
her review of various definitions of autoethnography, ‘Taking these words as a point 
of departure, I create my own responses to the call: Autoethnography is …’. As part 
of this process, she develops a list of actions and accomplishments that she looks for 
in her work and the work of others.  
 Participation as reciprocity 
 Partiality, reflexivity, and citationality as strategies for dialogue (and not 
mastery 
 Dialogue as a space of debate and negotiation 
 Personal narrative and storytelling as an obligation to critique 
 Evocation and emotion as incitements to action 
 Engaged embodiment as a condition for change.  
 
(Holman Jones, 2005, p. 773) 
Similarly, Denzin (2014, p. 78) grapples with the problem of how best to judge what 
he calls ‘performance’ autoethnography. For him, this requires ‘performative criteria’ 
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to evaluate whether or not performance texts accomplish the following: 
 Unsettle, criticize and challenge taken-for-granted, repressed meanings 
 Invite moral and ethical dialogue while reflexively clarifying their own moral 
position 
 Engender resistance and offer utopian thoughts about how things can be made 
different 
 Demonstrate that they care, that they are kind 
 Show, instead of tell, while using the rule that less is more 
 Exhibit interpretive sufficiency, representational adequacy, and authentic 
adequacy 
 Are political, functional, collective, and committed 
 
In contrast, Bochner and Ellis (2016) use the term,  ‘evocative’ autoethnography and 
put forward a list of criteria that include looking for abundant concrete details, 
wanting to feel the flesh and blood emotions of people coping with life’s 
contingencies and being offered structurally complex narratives that are told in a 
temporal framework representing the curve of time. As Bochner states in a 
conversation with Ellis and a group of students 
I expect evocative autoethnographers to examine their actions and dig 
underneath them, displaying the self on the page, taking a measure of life’s 
limitations, of cultural scripts that resist transformation, of contradictory 
feelings, ambivalence, and layers of subjectivity, squeezing comedy out of 
life’s tragedies … I hold the author to a demanding standard of ethical self-
consciousness … And finally, I want a story that moves me, my heart and 
belly as well as my head; I want a story that doesn’t just refer to subjective 
life, but instead acts it out in ways that show me what life feels like now and 
what it can mean. (Bochner & Ellis, 2016, p. 213). 
As ever, more lists are available. I hope, however, that what I have provided above 
gives a sense of how different lists of criteria have been developed for judging 
qualitative research in general, and autoethnography in particular. I have also tried to 
given a flavour of the kinds of criteria that have been called upon in the creation of 
such lists.  
Working with lists 
Any list of criteria can be used in a foundational, prescriptive and normative manner 
to police the boundaries of autoethnography and control its practitioners. Here, a list 
of predetermined criteria is defined as permanent and universal to be applied to any 
form of inquiry regardless of its intents and purposes. This list quickly becomes a 
rigid quality appraisal ‘checklist’ that is then used to set standards of ‘quality control’ 
for all forms of qualitative research. Criteria in this situation operate in an 
exclusionary and punitive manner to produce a closed system of judgment that 
establishes and maintains a narrow band of what constitutes good autoethnography or 
any other form of creative analytical practice. Consequently, innovative forms of 
autoethnography along with novel forms of representation are, by definition, excluded 
and/or demeaned as not worthy of attention.  
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But, of course, none of the scholars cited earlier want their suggested lists of criteria 
to be used in this negative way. For example, Pelias (2011, p. 666) states the 
following.  
I wish to articulate what I like and what I don’t without imposing my 
evaluative stance but having one that guides my practice as a reviewer, 
teacher, and writer. I leave open the possibility of other evaluative and more 
productive schemes. 
Having expressed what he does and does not like, Pelias (2011) does not insist that 
readers must adopt his standpoint or that they must apply his list of criteria regardless 
of the nature of their inquiry and their intentions and purposes. He simply offers the 
criteria he uses for consideration by others in their own work if they so wish.   
Barone and Eisner (2012) also express their own particular standpoint and emphasise 
that each of the criteria they have included in their list for judging arts-based research 
functions as cues for perception. They offer these criteria as starting points for 
thinking about the appraisal of works of arts-based research.  While their criteria may 
act as a common point of reflection, Barone and Eisner do not want them to be seen 
as a fixed recipe that all must follow as this would lead to rigid standardisation at the 
cost of innovation.  
So, finally, we invite you, the readers, to use your own judgement in applying 
these criteria to the examples of the works of arts based research included in 
this book and to those many that are not included. But we also urge you to use 
your imagination in ascertaining other criteria that may emerge from your 
encounters with arts based work in the future. (Barone & Eisner, 2012, p. 154-
155) 
Even though she speaks of universal criteria, Tracy (2010, p. 837) believes   the 
model she proposes is capable of being adapted to different theoretical frames and 
perspectives since it ‘leaves space for dialogue, imagination, growth and 
improvisation.’ Having noted that rules and guidelines can be helpful, she warns that 
‘grasping too strongly to any list of rules – and treating them as commandments rather 
than human made ideas is an act of delusion, suffering, and pain’ (p. 849). The danger 
lies in viewing any list of criteria as fixed and inflexible, thereby reducing them to a 
checklist and defeating their purpose and utility. 
The invitation by scholars to use their lists comes with the expectation that 
researchers approach them with the openness with which they were intended. The 
requirement of openness is enhanced if we adopt the non-foundational, or relativistic 
position as described by Smith and Hodkinson (2005, pp. 922-933). Here, rather than 
seeing criteria as abstract standards they are viewed as socially constructed lists of 
characteristics. 
As we approach judgment in any given case, we have in mind a list of 
characteristics that we use to judge the quality of that production. This is not a 
well-defined and precisely specified list; to the contrary, this list of 
characteristics is always open-ended, in part unarticulated, and always subject 
to constant interpretation reinterpretation … Our lists are invariably rooted in 
our standpoints and are elaborated through social interactions. 
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We might, therefore, discuss the characteristics of a particular approach to inquiry, 
such as evocative or performance autoethnography, and simply note that these criteria 
are the way different researchers seem to be conducting their particular kind of 
autoethnography at the moment. Thus, relativists, in providing their own lists or using 
those created by others, including those like Tracy’s (2010) that claim universality, 
are willing to describe what one might do, but are not prepared to mandate what one 
must do across all contexts and on all occasions prior to any piece of research being 
conducted.  
Smith and Deemer (2000) emphasize that any list we bring to judgment is always 
open-ended and we have the capacity to add to or subtract characteristics from the 
lists. This is necessarily so because the criteria used to judge a piece of research can 
change depending upon the context and the purposes. A characteristic of research we 
thought important at one time and in one place may take on diminished importance at 
another time and place s perspectives, climates, cultures, and goals change. Equally, 
something innovative might come along that does not fit well with existing lists of 
criteria. For Smith and Deemer this ‘opens up the possibility that one must 
reformulate one’s list and possibly replace the exemplars one calls upon in the never-
ending process of making judgments’ (p. 889). Regarding this possibility, Smith and 
Hodkinson (2005, p. 922) note the following: 
The limits for recasting our lists derive not primarily from theoretical labor but 
rather from the practical use to which lists are put as well as from the social, 
cultural, and historical contexts in which they are used. The limits of 
modification are worked and reworked within the context of actual practices 
or applications.  
That the creation and reworking of lists of criteria is accomplished in the doing and 
engagement with actual inquiries rather than via the distillation of some abstracted 
epistemology is evident in the work of Holman Jones (2005). Speaking of the list of 
criteria she has developed for judging her own work and that of others, she notes that 
they are changing and ‘are generated in the doing of this writing rather than outside or 
prior to it’ (773). Likewise, Gingrich-Philbrook (2013, p. 619) argues that lists ‘make 
so much more sense as something developed over time and experience, something 
that changes and grows, adapts to different writers, writing different projects, for 
different purposes, at different times.’ Indeed, even when discussing universal criteria 
for judging qualitative research, Tracy (2010) acknowledges that understanding 
qualitative goodness is best appreciated by embodying the methods ourselves as 
apprentices in the practice of research, and also vicariously studying the dilemmas of 
others.  
A good example of researchers actively engaging with criteria in practice is provided 
in the work of Gordon and Patterson (2013). They explored each of Tracy’s (2010) 
universal eight criteria for judging excellence in qualitative research by applying them 
to two separate studies they had conducted within a womanist caring framework. 
Having undertaken this task, Gordon and Patterson concluded as follows. 
Tracy’s universal criteria for qualitative research worked with the womanist 
caring frame. While the means for achieving her criteria manifested somewhat 
differently in each of our studies, they provided a useful guide for us to 
analyze and evaluate our own work. We believe Tracy’s criteria, her end 
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goals, could work with other theoretical frames, as well, taking shape 
according to each study’s frame and purpose … Tracy’s criteria for quality in 
qualitative research are powerful because they are universal but not fixed. 
That is, researchers can work toward the end goals through variant means.  
(Gordon and Patterson, 2013, p. 693) 
This said, in exploring Tracy’s (2010) criteria in relation to their own work, Gordon 
and Patterson (2013) found they lacked grounding in an ethical framework. From 
their perspective, Tracy mistakenly treats ethics as a stand- alone category whereas 
for them, using womanist caring as a framework to guide research places ethics at the 
heart of the research process from start to finish.  Gordon and Patterson, therefore, 
depart from Tracy in that they do not believe that ethics can, or should, be bracketed 
into its own discrete category. Accordingly, they develop and build on her thinking to 
foreground ethics as an overarching framework for criteria rather than a standalone 
category.  Whether one agrees with this point of departure or not, the key point is that 
this departure, its challenge to and modification of the list of criteria proposed by 
Tracy comes about via Gordon and Patterson’s practical application of her work to the 
doing of their own studies and not by a process of disengaged abstraction. Their work 
further indicates that regardless of Tracy’s claims of universality that her list of 
criteria can be utilized in a relativistic manner without accepting such claims. In short, 
people do not own the lists they create and do not control how they are used once they 
enter the public domain. 
 
The pedagogical potential of lists  
 
 As a teacher of qualitative inquiry I recognize that newcomers to the field can be 
bewildered by the vast array of criteria that are available for judging their own work 
and that of others. For Tracy (2010, p. 849) such bewilderment can be reduced 
initially by offering students her eight universal criteria as this provides them with 
what she calls a ‘common language of excellence for qualitative research.’ Equally, 
the lists of criteria provided earlier by, for example, Holman Jones (2005) for judging 
autoethnography, by Denzin (2014) for judging performance autoethnography, and 
Bochner and Ellis (2016) for judging evocative autoethnography, can also be used 
initially to reduce bewilderment by providing a common language or set of 
characteristics for discussing what goodness might mean in relation to 
autoethnography in its various forms.  
 
Such lists, I have found in my teaching, when used as starting points can provide an 
initial sense of security and direction for newcomers/ when they take the risk and 
engage with autoethnography for the first time. In this instance, Gingrich-Philbrook 
(2013, p. 619) notes the following. 
Budding autoethnographers may very well want the reassurance of a checklist 
outlining things a good autoethnography does, the quality it possesses, 
because that might help them decide when they have finished a piece they’re 
working on. Wouldn’t it be great to have a kind of a cross between an 
existential oven-timer and a drag-queen fairy godmother to look over your 
shoulder at the screen and say ‘Bing! You’re done, Honey; this shit is baked; 
anyone who tell you different, I will come over and stomp their ass’?  
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Of course it is not only budding autoethnographers who need such reassurance. I 
suspect that many a seasoned scholar has wished for, and found in some guise or 
other, the existential oven-timer and a drag-queen fairy godmother described by 
Gingrich-Philbrook (2013). I certainly know I have and still do. At times, we all need 
somebody we trust and respect to say, ‘You’re done, Honey; this shit is baked’. 
Indeed, as a teacher developing the confidence of my students on qualitative courses 
and in supporting my colleagues when they engage with creative analytical practices, 
I have often adopted, sometimes knowingly and sometimes less so, the role of 
existential oven-timer and a drag-queen fairy godmother. It is a worthy role to be 
celebrated. 
Even when not present in corporeal form, the combined existential oven-timer and 
drag-queen fairy godmother can manifest itself in a list of criteria. For example, 
Gordon and Patterson (2013) acknowledge how Tracy’s (2010) list provided them 
with a useful guide for analyzing and evaluating their own work framed by womanist 
caring theory, and suggest that her criteria could also prove useful with other 
theoretical frames depending on the intentions and purposes of the studies involved.  
Accordingly they propose that when writing qualitative studies for publication, 
Tracy’s criteria can provide a tool for scholars to monitor the quality of their own 
work and they believe that scholars ‘will strengthen their work if they make their use 
of Tracy’s criteria explicit’ (p. 693). Of course, any of the lists provided earlier can 
prove equally useful guides for the tasks described by Gordon and Patterson for other 
researchers depending on their starting points, intentions and purposes. 
But then, I begin to worry a little about the notion of criteria as a tool, with its 
mechanistic, linear and functional implications, to strengthen autobiography as a 
process rather than a product. My students often ask me what criteria I use as 
reference points when I go about writing an autobiography. They feel unsettled when 
my answer is ‘None’. By way of explanation, I offer them the words of Winterson 
(2012; 54) who draws attention to two kinds of writing: ‘the one you write and the 
one that writes you. The one that writes you is dangerous. You go where you don’t 
want to go. You look where you don’t want to look’. I also ask my students to access 
the sublime words of Leonard Cohen in his 2011 How I got My Song Address at the 
Prince Asturias Awards in Spain. Cohen tells the audience that he feels uneasy 
because he has always felt some ambiguity about an award for poetry. This is 
because, for him, ‘Poetry comes from a place that no one commands and no one 
conquers. So I feel somewhat like a charlatan to accept an award for an activity which 
I do not command. In other words, if I knew where the good songs came from I'd go 
there more often’.  
Echoing such thoughts, I inform my students about my feeling that, as an activity I do 
not command, my own autoethnographic stories have always written me far more 
than I have ever written them as part of an embodied process rather than just a textual 
product. Thus, as I have suggested elsewhere (Sparkes, 2013), autoethnography is at 
the will of the body, often involving unbeknown yet-to-be told stories that circulate 
within us at the pre-objective, enfleshed, multisensory and carnal level, not yet ready 
for language to take its hold. When the body is ready to release its story it lets us 
know in subtle ways so that we can accept its gift and engage in the somatic work of 
crafting a tale for the telling to self and others. 
Given what I had said above, it is important for me in my teaching that when it comes 
8 
 
to judging the products of autoethnography my students are invited to think about and 
with the various lists of criteria on offer that are often contested, overlapping and 
contradictory. I ask them to reflect on how they feel about any given criterion in their 
guts and in their flesh. They can then start to consider the ways in which this informs 
how they make what Beckett and Hager (2002) call ‘embodied judgments’ that are 
practical, emotional and corporeal as well as discursive in nature.  I also invite 
students in my classes to construct their own list of criteria from existing lists and to 
create and add their own if they so wish.  In this process, they can begin to explore 
why they are drawn towards and seduced by some criteria rather than others. All of 
which leads to a consideration of what Gadamer (1995) calls their effective histories 
and the prejudices each student brings to the selection of criteria and how they are 
used in judging their own work and that of others. 
As Smith and Deemer (2000) remind us, in any encounter with a production, 
especially something ‘new’, one must be willing to risk one’s prejudices. They point 
out that, ‘Just as in the process of judgment one asks questions of the text or person, 
the person or a text must be allowed to ask questions in return’ (p. 889). In 
approaching something novel or unfamiliar, therefore, be it a performance 
autoethnography or an evocative autoethnography, requires that one be willing to 
allow the text to challenge one’s prejudices and possibly change the criteria one is 
using to judge the piece, thereby changing one’s idea of what is and is not good 
inquiry. This said, Smith and Deemer point out that to be open does not mean to 
accept automatically, and that one may still offer reasons for rejecting something new. 
The outcome of any judgment is uncertain. They also stress that there is no method 
for engaging in the risking of one’s prejudices. If anything, Smith and Deemer argue, 
‘to risk one’s prejudices is a matter of disposition – or, better said, moral obligation – 
that requires one to accept that if one wishes to persuade others, one must be equally 
open to be persuaded’’ (p. 889). This view is supported by Gingrich-Philbrook (2013, 
p. 618) in his following comment. 
Any evaluation of autoethnography, then, is simply another story from a 
highly situated, privileged, empowered subject about something he or she 
experienced.  To evaluate autoethnography in a genuinely useful way, you 
have to open yourself up to being changed by it, to heeding its call to 
surrender your entitlement. 
Risking ones’ prejudices and surrendering one’s entitlement in relation to judgment 
criteria for autoethnography or any other form of inquiry is no easy task. It means 
assuming the responsibility to listen carefully and respectfully, attempting to grasp 
emotionally, viscerally and discursively what is being expressed in something 
‘different’ so that judgment might be passed in an ethical, fair and caring manner. 
This requires, according to Sparkes (2009), and Sparkes and Smith (2014), the 
qualities of connoisseurship as described by to Eisner (1991). For him, 
connoisseurship involves the ability to make fine-grained discriminations among 
complex and subtle qualities, it is the art of appreciation and can be displayed in ‘any 
realm in which the character, import, or value of objects, situations, and performances 
is distributed and variable’ (p. 63). Eisner emphasizes that the term appreciation 
should not be conflated with ‘a liking for’.  
There is no necessary relationship between appreciating something and liking 
it … Nothing in connoisseurship as a form of appreciation requires that our 
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judgments be positive. What is required (or desired) is that our experience be 
subtle, complex, and informed (Eisner, 1991, pp. 68–69).  
In seeking to develop the characteristics of connoisseurship in myself and my 
students, I want to make it clear that this does not involve what Smith and Deemer 
(2000, p. 202) call a romanticized ‘intellectual flight from power.’ Part of 
connoisseurship requires a critical awareness and appreciation of how power and 
politics at the macro (e.g., national) and micro (e.g., faculty) levels operate and are 
interwoven into the complex social interactions that define which criteria, from all 
those available, are selected for use to sort out the good from the bad.  As Tracy 
(2010, p. 838) states, ‘a consequence of any delineation of criteria is political.’ In 
relation to this, Smith and Hodkinson (2005, p. 923) remind us that researchers of all 
persuasions use whatever resources they have at their disposal to ‘support, preserve, 
or strengthen those rules (or lists of characteristics) that they approve of or are in their 
interests and/or to change the rules (or lists) lists in a direction that favors their 
interests.’  
Lists of criteria, as pedagogical devices, can be used to help students explore issues of 
power and politics in relation to how they are created, legitimized and used to 
foreground certain voices and silence others. To this end, I share with students my 
own experiences of crafting an autoethnographically informed piece of work that 
spoke truth to power and the consequences that followed when, as a hostile reaction to 
this work, managerial power was enacted in its most raw and questionable form (see 
Sparkes, 2007, 2017). Against this backdrop, I understandably encourage and help 
students to develop practical strategies for defending and promoting their interests in 
various contexts.  
With regard to different contexts, it may well be correct, acceptable and in a student’s 
interests in a PhD viva to express the view that passing judgment in qualitative 
inquiry is a matter of embodied interpretation, with lists of criteria being fluid and 
changing, open-ended and context specific, leaving us with only multiple standards 
and temporary criteria.  In contrast, such a view might not be so well received at a job 
interview where the majority of the selection panel is composed of positivists or post-
positivists who may be unprepared, unable or simply unwilling to call on a variety of 
criteria to appropriately evaluate qualitative work. In short, the likelihood is that they 
do not possess the qualities of connoisseurship as described earlier. In such a 
situation, characterized by major power differentials, it may be advantageous to call 
upon the ‘universal’ criteria named by Tracy (2010) as ‘stable’ ’ markers of quality 
for qualitative research as a means of engaging in dialogue and protecting one’s 
interest. 
The tactics suggested above might be frowned upon by many as being unethical and 
dishonest, and interpreted as selling one’s self short or just selling out completely. 
One might also question, however, the ethics of sending students (or young scholars 
in general) naively into situations where power and politics come into play about 
judgment criteria without preparing them in the darker arts of conceptual self-defense 
and strategies of self-preservation. For me, using lists as a way of learning to play the 
criteria game is not an act of consent to dominant views of what constitutes good or 
bad research. Rather, as Tracy (2010) notes, it is a strategically designed way to 
respond and act within, rather than being ‘worked over’ in hostile situations.  All this 
said, I am fully aware that questions about how, as qualitative researchers, we create 
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and construct our lists of criteria and the uses we put them to in various contexts will 
not be found in epistemology. Rather, as Smith and Hodkinson (2005, p. 930) remind 
us, ‘they will be found in our reasoning as finite practical and moral beings.’  
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